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Abstract  
 
Since its foundation in 1999 Boko Haram has carried out numerous acts of violence on the 
territory of Nigeria. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has been monitoring the violence between Boko Haram and Nigerian armed forces as 
part of a preliminary investigation.  It has stated that there is reason to believe that Boko 
Haram is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity and that the violence 
between Boko Haram and the armed forces has reached the level of an armed conflict of non-
international character under international law. This paper assesses certain types of behaviour 
of Boko Haram from an Islamic law perspective and examines whether Islamic law 
condemns or justifies such acts. Arguably, it would help the ICC in asserting the legitimacy 
of its judgments, if it was able to prove that such judgments are compatible with the legal and 
belief system recognised by the actors at trial. In turn it would enable the Court to deal with 
at least some of the criticism aimed at it, for being an imperialistic institution.  
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1 Introduction 
Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute
1
 on 27 September 2001. During the period up to, and 
inclusive of, 1 June 2013, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) received 65 communications under Article 15 of the Rome Statute in relation to 
Nigeria. 28 of these were included in the preliminary examination.
2
 The Court publicly 
announced that it was undertaking a preliminary examination into events in Nigeria on 18 
November 2010. At the invitation of the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, the OTP 
undertook a mission to Nigeria in July 2012, and gathered information on the attacks which 
had been attributed to Boko Haram.
3
 Following on from this mission, the OTP determined 
that there was a reasonable basis to believe that since 2009 Boko Haram has committed acts 
constituting the crimes against humanity of murder under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute 
and persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute.
4
 According to the OTP 2012 Report, 
since 2009 the group has ‘launched a widespread and systematic attack that has resulted in 
the killing of more than 1,200 Christian and Muslims [sic] civilians in different locations 
throughout Nigeria.’5 With regard to war crimes, the OTP in its recent Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2013,
6
 determined that an armed conflict of non-international 
character did exist on the territory of Nigeria between the Nigerian security forces and Boko 
Haram and it was consequently proceeding with the investigation with regard to both crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.  
 
This paper will tackle some important questions about the jihādī ideology and practices of 
Boko Haram from an Islamic law perspective and will examine whether Islamic law 
condemns or justifies such acts. Among these questions are the following: Can members of 
                                                          
* A version of this paper was presented by Dr. Mohamed Elewa Badar as part of the Guest Lecture Series of the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 30 January 2014.  
1
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, A/CONF.183/9 
2
 See International Criminal Court, ‘Nigeria’, available online at 
 <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref
/pe-ongoing/nigeria/Pages/nigeria.aspx> (visited 19 September 2013). 
3
 See Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012’, available online at 
<http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20r
ef/pages/report-on-preliminary-examination-activities-2012.aspx> (visited 9 September 2013), at para. 93. 
4
 See The Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Nigeria Article 5 Report’, available online at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20-%20NGA%20-%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-
%2005%20August%202013.PDF> (visited 18 September 2013), at para. 15. 
5
 Ibid at para. 15 and see also paras 46-51  
6
 Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at paras 214-218. 
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Boko Haram claim that they are immune from prosecution as these crimes were committed 
during the context of jihād? Who can declare jihād and against whom this can be declared? 
Are the alleged crimes committed by these groups prohibited under Islamic law? Answers to 
these questions will provide important guidance to the ICC as it proceeds with the Nigerian 
situation. In the past the Court has been heavily criticised as an imperialist institution, 
imposing a Westernised view of justice on African states. In order to counter some of these 
criticisms the Court needs to be open to an analysis of the implementation of Shari’a law in 
situations and cases where it is relevant, such as in Nigeria. This will help to legitimise the 
Court’s decisions and judgments. 
 
Section 2 of this paper traces the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and discusses the motivations 
of this group. It describes some of its violent activities and the reactions of the Nigerian 
government and armed forces. It also explores the incorporation of Shari’a based rules into 
the Nigerian legal system.  Section 3 provides an analysis of Boko Haram’s jihādī ideology, 
how the practice of suicide attacks was misrepresented as martyrdom to the impressionable 
followers of this group, and the criminal liability of those who incited the commission of such 
attacks under Islamic law.  
 
2 Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram   
Nigeria is a federation of 36 states, and a federal capital territory of Abuja, with 168 million 
inhabitants; making it the most populous country in Africa.
7
 It has almost 350 ethnic groups, 
speaking about 250 different languages.
8
 About 50% of the population are Muslim, 40% are 
Christian, and 10% follow traditional African religions.
9
 Most Muslims live in North-Nigeria, 
whereas Christians and the traditional African religions believers inhabit the southern half of 
the country.
10
 The southern part of the country has primarily been influenced by western 
politics, education, culture and economy.
11
  
 
                                                          
7
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, ‘Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria’ (2012) 40 South African Journal of Military 
Studies 1-21, at 7. See also The Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at para.18.  
8
 Brinkel and Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 8.  
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid; See also CRS Report for Congress, ‘Nigeria: Current Issues’, available online at 
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/102651.pdf> (visited 19 June 2013), 11. 
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The political history of Nigeria ‘has been dotted with images of violent conflagrations and 
acts of terrorism’12 since colonial times and inter-communal and ethnic violence have 
continued to define the State’s history since independence in 1960.13 Since 1999, central and 
northern parts of Nigeria, which had previously been relatively peaceful,
14
 have been affected 
by serious inter-communal political and sectarian and religious violence.
15
 The main causes 
include ethnic and or religious divisions in the states, as well as a struggle for political power, 
poverty and unemployment.
16
 A US National Council Intelligence report from 2005 predicted 
that Nigeria would disintegrate within 15 years
17
 and ‘to many public commentators and even 
some prominent Nigerian leaders, the country is cascading towards becoming a failed state.’18 
This all has as a consequence that ‘many Muslims are becoming increasingly sceptical about 
a system that has brought them little benefit and has served well the interests of the 
established elite.’19 They would therefore, as noted by Brinkel and Ait-Hida, ‘show an 
alternative to the dominant political culture by leading an exemplary life that is marked by 
austerity, community service and rejection of corruption.’20  
 
2.1 The Rise of Boko Haram 
Against the background of state failure, poverty and unemployment, the radical group of 
Boko Haram emerged in the mid-1990s.
21
 According to the then Nigerian Director of 
Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Yerima, the sect has existed since 1995 under the 
leadership of Abubakah Lawan. The group later came under the control of Mohammed 
                                                          
12
 O Osumah, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal Insecurity’ (2013) 
24:3 Small Wars and Insurgencies 536-560, 537. 
13
 I Aghedo and O Osumah, ‘The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?’(2012) 33:5 Third 
World Quarterly 853-869.  
14
 A Epelle, ‘Challenges and Solutions to Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Case Study of the Jobs Crisis’ 
(2011) 13:5 Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 109-124, 109. 
15
 FC Onuoha, ‘The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained’ (2010) 19 African Security 
Review 54-67, at 54. See also GJ Weimann, Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria: Politics, Religion, 
Judicial Practice (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2010), 147. 
16
 The Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at para. 77-80.   
17
 O Agbaje, ‘The US Intelligence Report’, The Guardian, Tuesday 14 June 2005, 65. 
18
 O Osumah, supra n 12. 
19
 D Isaacs, ‘Islam in Nigeria: simmering tensions’, BBC News, 24 September 2003. Available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3155279.stm> (visited 9 September 2013).   
20
 See T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 5; R Loimeier, ‘Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant 
Religious Movement in Nigeria’ (2012) 2-3 African Spectrum 137-155; O Osumah, supra n 12 and D Agbiboa, 
‘Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective’ (2013) 3:1 African Conflict and 
Peacebuilding Review 144-157. 
21
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 10; On the establishment and development of Boko Haram, see 
generally O Osumah, supra n 12 and JP Pham, ‘Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat’ (2012) 20 Africa Security Brief 
1-8. 
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Yusuf, and became rooted in the Islamic Yusuifyya.
22
 Mohammed Yusuf was a charismatic 
preacher of violent, extreme Islam, and was responsible for radicalisation of Boko Haram.
23
 
However, following the revolt of 2009 – the attempt to overthrow the authority of the state – 
he was captured and brutally killed in police custody.
24
 After his death, Abubakar Shekau 
became the new leader.
25
 However, reports of his death were published in August 2013.
26
 
 
The sect itself was founded in Maiduguri but moved in 2004 to Kanamma, in the federal state 
of Yobe, which is close to the border with Niger.
27
 Since then, this has been the base from 
which Boko Haram has organised its assaults.
28
 The sect is financed by a number of sources 
of income, including contributions by members of the sect and donations by politicians, 
government functionaries and organisations within Nigeria,
29
 and from abroad.
30
  
 
Boko Haram has over 280,000 members across the 19
 
states of North Nigeria, Chad and 
Sudan.
31
  Most members of the sect are young boys and men who moved from the rural areas 
to urban areas, in search for a better life.
32
 As a result of unemployment in the cities, many of 
them ended up attending school, such as Almajiri, which provides cheap education and 
imbues the young boys with a radical interpretation of Islam, thus preparing them to 
contribute in ethno-religious conflicts.
33
 Therefore, ‘Boko Haram provided the disenchanted 
with a platform from which to attack the system which they believe is largely responsible for 
their situation.’34 Members behave as if they belong to a religious sect, pray in their own 
mosques, do not mix with the local residents and are recognised by their long beards and 
                                                          
22
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 10.  
23
 Ibid. 
24
 FC Onuoha, supra n 15, 60.  
25
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 11. 
26
 BBC News, ‘Abubakar Shekau of Nigeria's Boko Haram “may be dead”’, 19 August 2013.Available online at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23761048> (visited 19 September 2013). A Nigerian intelligence 
report stated that Shekau was shot on 30 June 2013 when soldiers raided a Boko Haram base at Sambisa Forest 
in north-eastern Nigeria and died in July or August 2013. However, Boko Haram has not commented on this 
report. 
27
 FC Onuoha, supra n 15, 55.  
28
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 10.  
29
 Ibid.  
30
 FC Onuoha, supra n 15, 56.   
31
 Ibid, 58. 
32
 Ibid, 62. 
33
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 9; A Walker, ‘What is Boko Haram?’(United States Institute for Peace, 
Washington, 2012), available online at <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf> (visited 9 
September 2013), 6. 
34
 FC Onuoha, supra n 15, 63. 
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turbans.
35
 However, their main feature is their ‘adherence to a specific form of radical 
Islam.’36 They see themselves as Muslims who, in their view, preach the only true 
interpretation of Islam.
37
  
 
2.2 The Boko Haram Revolt  
The ideological aim of Boko Haram is the introduction of strict Shari’a law in the whole of 
Nigeria.
38
 This is reflected in the name itself. Boko Haram means literally: ‘Western 
education/civilisation is evil.’39 For this group, only education based on the lessons of the 
Qur’Ɨn and the Sunnah are an adequate alternative to Western and secular education.40 Boko 
Haram is therefore against those in northern Nigeria who are known as ‘yan boko’,41 literally 
‘child of the book,’ who are regarded as the ‘elite created by the policy of indirect rule used 
by the British to colonize Nigeria’,42 and who have been influenced by money and corrupt 
Western values.
43
 To be yan boko, as noted by Walker, ‘is to be spiritually and morally 
corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than 
dedicating oneself to the Muslim Umma (community).’44 Shari’a law is intended ‘to clean the 
Nigerian system which is populated by Western education and uphold the law all over the 
country.’45  
 
Since 2009, Boko Haram members have killed a number of Christian worshippers in 
churches, police officers, soldiers, as well as local politicians, community leaders, and 
Islamic clerics who resist the sect.
46
 Until recently the activities by Boko Haram had mainly 
been in North Nigeria,
47
 however, in August 2011 Boko Haram attacked the headquarters of 
the United Nations in Abuja, killing at 26 people.
48
  
 
                                                          
35
 Ibid, 56.  
36
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 12.  
37
 Ibid; FC Onuoha, supra n 15, 57.  
38
 Ibid; GJ Weimann, supra n 15, 147; and A Walker, supra n 33, 1.   
39
 H O Yusuf, ‘Harvest of Violence: The Neglect of Basic Rights and the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria’, 
(2013) 6:3 Critical Studies on Terrorism 371-391. T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 11.  
40
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 11. 
41
 A Walker, supra n 33, 7.  
42
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 11.  
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid.  
45
 FC Onuoha, supra n 15, 57.  
46
 Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at paras 81-83. 
47
 T Brinkel and S Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 2.  
48
 Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at para 82; A Walker, supra n 33, 6.  
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In an attempt to deal with Boko Haram,  President Goodluck Jonathan sent a Joint Task Force 
(JTF), to the North of Nigeria.
49
 Security agents killed hundreds of suspected members of the 
sect, with Nigerian authorities arresting over hundreds of people during the raids across the 
North of Nigeria. However, many of those detained were isolated and held without due 
process, were detained in inhuman conditions and were the subject of physical abuse, thus, 
violating their human rights, as noted by Human Rights Watch.
50
 As a consequence, these 
abuses and violations helped further stimulate the sect’s campaign of violence.51 In May 2013 
President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three north-eastern states, 
claiming that Boko Haram threatened the existence of Nigeria.
52
 A further 3,000 troops were 
deployed to the JTF, raising its total number to 8,000.
53
 Some reports highlight the success of 
the JTF in combating Boko Haram; however, the group has not been defeated and the 
violence continues.
54
 Civilians in Borno fear the JTF as ‘harassment is common in an 
environment where almost every man is treated as a potential Boko Haram member.’55 This 
had led to men in Borno and Yobe setting up vigilante groups whose role is to identify 
Islamists to the military. In June 2013, a terrorism proscription order
56
 was adopted under the 
2011 Nigerian Terrorism Prevention Act,
57
 which declared Boko Haram to be a terrorist 
group, thus adding a criminal justice dimension to the situation.
58
 Attacks continued 
throughout the beginning of 2014 and the violence has not dissipated.
59
 
 
The group has attracted significant attention from the international community. For example, 
the UN Security Council has condemned Boko Haram attacks, 
60
 and the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution in July 2013 strongly condemning the escalation of violence 
                                                          
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid; A Walker, supra n 33, 13. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 See International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Nigeria’s emergency: countering Boko Haram’ (2013) 19, 
Comment 23. 
53
 There are fears that serious human rights abuses are being committed under the cover of the Task Force. See 
ibid, 1.  
54
Ibid, 1. 
55
 See Ibid, 1. 
56
 Terrorism (Prevention) (Proscription Order) Notice 2013. 
57
 Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 (As Amended). 
58
 Institute for Security Studies, ‘Why Nigeria Needs a Criminal Tribunal and Not Amnesty for Boko Haram’, 
24 June 2013, available online at <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-nigeria-needs-a-criminal-tribunal-
and-not-amnesty-for-boko-haram> (visited 7 October 2013). 
59
 ‘Nigeria Boko Haram crisis: Emir's palace burnt in Bama’, BBC News Africa, 20February 2014, available at 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26275207> (visited 6 March 2014). 
60
 Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria, SC/10507 Afr/2309. 
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on the part of Boko Haram.
61
 In addition, a number of individual states have condemned the 
actions of the group and have recognised the group as a terrorist organisation, including the 
US which placed a bounty of US$7million on the group’s leader through its Rewards for 
Justice programme
62
 in 2011 and the UK which recognised Boko Haram as a terrorist 
organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000 in 2013.
63
  
 
2. The Implementation of Shari’a in Nigeria  
Nigeria’s legal system is founded on common law principles, a legacy of its past as a British 
colony. Prior to colonisation, however, the law applicable in the territory was based on 
custom. In the northern part of modern day Nigeria, the majority of the population was – and 
still is – Muslim, and thus the local laws were based on Islam. During colonial times, both 
common law rules, in the form of received English law, and customary law rules, including 
Shari’a law in the north, were applied in relation to civil law issues, as long as they was not 
repugnant to English law.
64
 Shari’a courts, ‘area courts’,65 based on this customary system, 
were established to deal with personal and civil issues under Shari’a law. With regard to 
criminal law, the British enacted a Criminal Code. However, this was met with dissatisfaction 
from Muslims in the north who felt that this Code did not adequately reflect Islamic 
principles. Thus, a Penal Code, which was more reflective of these principles, was adopted in 
respect of the northern states.
66
 
 
Nigeria embraced democracy in 1998 after the death of the Nigerian dictator General Sani 
Abacha.
67
 The move to democracy
68
 coincided with the adoption of a new Constitution on 29 
May 1999, essentially a reinstatement of the 1979 constitution,
 69
 which has precedence over 
all other sources of law.
70
 Article 38(1) of this document guarantees freedom of religion and 
                                                          
61
 ‘Situation in Nigeria’, European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2013 on the situation in Nigeria 
(2013/2691(RSP)), 8. 
62
 Rewards for Justice, available online at <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net> (visited 7 October 2013). 
63
 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2013/1746. 
64
 VO Nmehielle, ‘Sharia Law in the Northern States of Nigeria: To Implement or Not to Implement, the 
Constitutionality is the Question’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 730-759, 736. 
65
 P Ostien and A Dekker, ‘Sharia and National Law in Nigeria’, in JM Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A 
Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, (Leiden 
University Press, Leiden 2010) 553-612. 
66
 Ibid, 574. 
67
 VO Nmehielle, supra n 64, 730-731. 
68
 AF Akwara and BO Ojomah, ‘Religion, Politics and Democracy in Nigeria’ (2013) 9:2 Canadian Social 
Science 48-61, 52-55. 
69
 P Ostien and A Dekker, supra n 65, 574. 
70
 Section 1(3) Constitution of Nigerian 1999. 
(2014) International Human Rights Law Review vol. 3/1  (pp. 29-60)  
37 
 
Article 1(1) clarifies that the Constitution is applicable to all regions of Nigeria. In addition, 
Article 10 confirms that Nigeria does not endorse a state religion.
71
  
 
Within months of the enactment of the Constitution however, the governors of twelve states 
in the north of the country declared that the Islamic legal system would be fully implemented 
within their states and that Shari’a law would apply to all aspects of a person’s life, including 
criminal acts, in parallel with the secular legal system.
72
  This went far beyond the previous 
system where Shari’a law was implemented in relation to civil and personal matters only. In 
these states Shari’a Penal Codes and Criminal Procedure Codes were implemented alongside 
the extant Penal and Criminal Codes. The pre-existing codes were applied in the Magistrate’s 
and High Courts whereas the Shari’a Codes were applied in the Shari’a Courts.73 The 
substantive offences which are covered in eighteen chapters of the Penal Code have been 
condensed into three chapters of the Shari’a Penal Codes. These deal with different categories 
of offences, i.e. Hudūd and Hudud-Related Offences, Qisas and Qisas-Related Offences and 
Ta’azir Offences. The first two chapters have been redrafted in line with the Maliki doctrine 
and ‘classical punishments’ are imposed.74  Shari’a law provides for the imposition of much 
more severe sentences and penalties than the Penal Code, including amputation and stoning.
75
 
 
Another difficulty with the implementation of Shari’a law was that because the police are a 
federal institution in Nigeria, no institution could enforce these penalties. This led to the rise 
of vigilante groups who would ‘operate primarily in the cities against individuals or groups 
who were, or were perceived to be, violating shari’a norms.’76 Thus, the implementation of 
Shari’a law led to dissatisfaction among many Nigerians which resulted in violent ethnic 
clashes and the loss of many lives in some parts of the region.
77
  
 
It should be noted however, that the implementation of Shari’a law in the northern states has 
not been uniform.  State governors were ‘caught between popular demands for the 
                                                          
71
 AF Akwara and BO Ojomah, supra n 68, 52-55. 
72
 VO Nmehielle, supra n 64, 731-732. 
73
 P Ostien and A Dekker, supra n 65, 589. 
74
 Ibid, 589.  
75
 KN Roberts, ‘Constitutionality of Shari'a Law in Nigeria and the Higher Conviction Rate of Muslim Women 
under Shari'a Fornication and Adultery Laws’ (2005) 14:2 Southern California Review of Law and Women's 
Studies 315-336. 
76
 D Cook, ‘Boko Haram: A Prognosis’, (2011) James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 
1-33, at 22 available online at http://bakerinstitute.org/files/735/, 7. 
77
 VO Nmehielle, supra n 64, 732. 
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introduction of the sharia and the exigencies of their office, established by the secular 
Nigerian Constitution.’78 Some governors, often with an eye on international reaction and 
future promotion,
79
 have, therefore, been hesitant to implement the Shari’a regime and/or 
have intervened in its implementation. For example, some governors require that they must 
approve the carrying out of severe punishments provided for under the Shari’a system such as 
amputations.
80
   
 
Questions arose as to the legality of broadening the scope of issues that could be dealt with 
under the Shari’a system to include criminal activity in the northern states. Arguments in 
support of the constitutionality of this move focus on the issue of appeals from Shari’a courts 
to the Shari’a Court of Appeal, bypassing the High Court. Article 277(1) of the Constitution 
states: 
The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction as 
may be conferred upon it by the law of the State, exercise such appellate and 
supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal 
law which the court is competent to decide in accordance with the provisions of 
subsection (2) of this section. 
Subsection (2) then lists a number of issues concerning personal law, including marriage, 
inheritance etc. However, a literal interpretation of the phrase ‘in addition to other 
jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the State’ leaves the provision open to 
include criminal activities also, even if this is contrary to the intention of the drafters.
81
 
 
However, a number of legal questions remain as to the legality of imposing Shari’a law in the 
northern states of Nigeria, including the validity of such a move given that Article 10 of the 
Constitution states that there is no State religion, the issue of the constitutional ban on 
discrimination based solely on religion,
82
 the consistency of Shari’a-based punishments with 
the constitutional ban on cruel inhuman and degrading treatment,
83
 and Nigeria’s 
                                                          
78
 GJ Weimann, supra n 15, 171. 
79
 P Ostien and A Dekker, supra n 65, 592. 
80
 See GJ Weimann, supra n 15. 
81
 P Ostien and A Dekker, supra n 65, 581. 
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international human rights obligations. However, as individuals are unwilling to take these 
questions before a Court in Nigeria, these issues remain unresolved.
84
 
 
It seems, therefore, that under the current Shari’a Penal Codes in force in the northern states 
of Nigeria, members of Boko Haram, who are charged with crimes could be prosecuted in 
Shari’a courts and, taking a literal interpretation of Article 277 of the Constitution, any 
decision could be appealed to a state Shari’a Court of Appeal. It is therefore necessary to 
understand the actions of members of this group from an Islamic law perspective. 
 
3 Boko Haram's Ideology and Practices 
While Boko Haram’s violence can be attributed in part to political, economic and social 
factors,
85
 the primary reason for the violence is an ideologically-skewed religious rhetoric.
86
 
Surprisingly, no academic study of the ideology of Boko Haram and its diversion from the 
fundamental tenets of Islam has yet been conducted. This may be because Boko Haram is a 
movement with the primary target to attack or counterattack with less focus on rationalising 
or theorising their ideology in a written document. However, there is a vast amount of oral 
material produced by some Boko Haram members for supporters and sympathisers that are 
only available in Hausa or other local languages.
87
 To reach a relatively fair and objective 
analysis of Boko Haram, and to locate their practices within the realm of Islamic criminal 
law, the two signature issues of their jihādi ideology and practices need to be presented and 
evaluated.
88
  
 
The first signature issue concerning the ideological inclinations espoused by Boko Haram 
members can be understood in light of two main elements: first, the leaders of the movement 
and their theological training and second, their attitude towards employing jihād and 
martyrdom in the Nigerian context to fit their agendas and to therefore, justify their practices. 
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According to one commentator, the murdered leader of Boko Haram, Mohamed Yusuf, 
‘received instruction in Salafi radicalism and was a protégé of Ibn Taymiyyah’,89 a sign of 
how this late charismatic leader was inspired by the medieval thinker Ibn Taymiyah's (1263-
1328 CE) views on jihād.90 The whereabouts of the instruction - the contextual interpretations 
of Ibn Taymiyah's views on jihād with which Yusuf and his followers were influenced by - is 
not actually known. However, there is a common element between this religious learning 
acquisition and ideological preference embraced by the Boko Haram prominent members and 
that of Qu৬b,91 members of the militant Islamic group in Egypt in the 1970s as well as late 
and current leaders of al-Qaeda who were influenced by the same line of thinking of Ibn 
Taymiyah.
92
 The undeniable influence of Ibn Taymiyah’s views on such groups in past and 
present reveals that Boko Haram and their like-minded followers depend heavily on persons 
rather than texts in formulating their views. This demonstrates their inability to deduce 
Islamic rulings from their original sources. Unfortunately, this inherited personal influence of 
the Boko Haram leaders is easily communicated to ordinary and senior members of the group 
to the extent that Abu Dujana, a senior member of Boko Haram, would ‘give up his job, and 
kill in the name of God.’93 Since members of Boko Haram have not had a religious education 
capable of giving them scholarly insight, their views about Muslim-non-Muslim relations are 
neither scholarly nor authoritative. They are not considered to be trained theologians or 
scholars well-versed in their fields.  
 
3.1 Jihādī Ideology of Boko Haram 
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In a statement attributed to Boko Haram's founding leader Yusuf, ‘Our land was an Islamic 
state before the colonial masters turned it into a kafir land. The current system is contrary to 
true Islamic beliefs.’94 Therefore, the authority of the Nigerian state is, according to him, 
based on unbelief (kufr).
95
 Here, Yusuf is using almost the same classical classification of the 
world into what is famously known as dār al-Islām96 (territory of Islam) and dār al-ۊarb97 
(territory of war). Surprisingly, this dichotomous classification is profoundly un-Qur’Ɨnic.98  
The only hadīth (pl. ahādīth – meaning the sayings of the prophet that relate to Islam),99 
narration cited in reference to it is hard to find in the collections of authentic hadīth, which 
throws doubt on the authenticity of the classification, at least in the understanding of the first 
two sources of Shari’a.100 It seems that this dichotomous classification embraced by Boko 
Haram and other movements and groups, is a product of a juristic ijtihād (exertion of 
intellectual reasoning in understanding laws) mainly based on the attitude of the Muslim state 
towards its enemies and friends during the second Islamic century.
101
 More interestingly, the 
geographical location of the Muslim state compared to other non-Muslim states at that time 
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was certainly a determining factor in forming this dichotomous vision, as well as the binary 
division of jihād into two modalities: defensive and offensive.  
 
Moreover, the “international” un-Qur’Ɨnic classical division of the world cannot, in our view, 
be justifiably transferred and adopted to a completely different modern multi-faiths Nigerian 
context where Muslims and non-Muslims have to live side-by-side, as the leader(s) of Boko 
Haram has claimed. This binary and eccentric attitude of Boko Haram’s understanding of 
modern international relations claims that the “jihad” they are launching within the Nigerian 
territories is for self-defence,
102
 where the Nigerian government, military, police, the Muslim 
elite, Christians, and the UN ‘represent manifestations of non-Islamic outer world.’103 
 
The above claim about Boko Haram’s defensive jihād cannot be justified, either Islamically 
or Qur’Ɨnically, for the following reasons.104 First, Boko Haram unilaterally declares its 
attacks against Muslims and non-Muslims in a total disregard for the Qur’Ɨnic conception of 
diversity, human brotherhood, and peaceful relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
referred to, for example, in Qur’Ɨn 2:148; 5:48; 49:13. According to Boko Haram, anyone, 
‘even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, if we confirm that he exposes us to the [Nigerian] 
government, his children will become orphans and his wife will become a widow.’105 This 
way of repelling aggression against Muslims and other fellow humans stands in total contrast 
to the clear Qur’Ɨnic message in which God says, ‘if anyone kills a person—unless in 
retribution for murder or spreading corruption in the land—it is as if he kills all mankind, 
while if anyone saves a life it is as if he saves the lives of all mankind.’106  
 
Second, the claim of exercising ‘defensive jihād’ as a way of establishing an Islamic state 
through crushing ‘all institutions represented by government including security agencies like 
police, military and other uniformed personnel’,107 is nothing but a lame excuse because 
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Boko Haram leaders and their followers—compared to the rest of Muslim population in 
Nigeria—constitute a tiny minority. Moreover, the declaration of jihād is the prerogative of 
the ruler of the Muslim state or his deputy
108 
and Boko Haram members, as non-state actors, 
are not allowed to declare it. Alternatively, the declaration of jihād should be reserved for 
national armies, which are found in almost all Muslim majority countries.
109
 Undoubtedly, 
Boko Haram in Nigeria cannot be considered a national army. Therefore, its alleged 
declaration of jihād is baseless.110 
 
3.2 Suicide Misrepresented as Martyrdom to the Impressionable Followers of Boko Haram 
Martyrdom in Boko Haram’s understanding is a self-sacrificing ideology in which the main, 
and probably only, source of inspiration, understanding, and motivation is the main leader(s) 
of the movement. Most of the members who are ‘an assemblage of youths who were school 
drop-outs and university graduates who were not gainfully employed’,111 have a tarnished 
understanding of the noble concept of martyrdom in Islam similar to that of jihād. It is not 
known whether Boko Haram members have a published treatise of their understanding of 
martyrdom in Islam and how they employ it. These members, unfortunately, depend almost 
entirely on leaders such as Abubakar Shekau for their 'knowledge, inspiration, and daily 
survival'.
112
 Such leaders, who are themselves poorly-educated in Islamic studies, impart their 
misconstrued claims about martyrdom to their manipulated and emotionally-victimised 
followers.  
 
Here, it is worth shedding some light on the meaning and concept of martyrdom and suicide 
in Islam, as two opposing concepts which are probably (ab)used by Boko Haram members 
and their staunch opponents. As far as the term martyrdom (istishhād) is concerned, the word 
shahīd (pl. shuhadā’) refers to one who is killed in the path of Allah. The verbs ustushhida or 
istashhada and tashahhada mean ‘he was killed as a shahīd’, he sought martyrdom 
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(shahādah) respectively.113 The closest word, which conveys a similar meaning in English 
language, is the word ‘martyr’. It refers to a ‘person who is killed or made to suffer greatly 
because of his/her religious or other beliefs’,114 including ‘political beliefs.’115 However, 
‘martyr’, although the closest, is not a precise, translation of ‘shahīd’, because the meaning 
generally attached to the Arabic term conveys being killed on the battlefield, as compared 
with the English word ‘martyr’, which connotes death as a result of defending religious and 
non-religious beliefs.  
 
The term shahīd occurs ‘no less than fifty-six times’116 in the Qur’Ɨn in different singular and 
plural forms denoting five different meanings: a witness as in 2:282, being attentive as in 
50:37, being present as in 4:72, being a watcher as in 5:117, and being a judge or arbitrator as 
in 10:29.
 117
 With the exception of the first meaning, none of the above conveys an apparent 
commonality with the English word ‘martyr’. Quite often, the noun shahīd is used in the 
Qur’Ɨn to refer to one who witnesses an event as in 4:41. Allah is also a shahīd or a witness 
to His creatures, especially the People of the Book as in the Qur’Ɨn 3:98.118  Al-Shahīd is one 
of the Divine attributes of Allah.
119
  Thus, it is clear that the Arabic term shahīd is very much 
associated with the English word ‘witness’, especially when the former is used for meanings 
other than dying on the battlefield. Of the two apparently close equivalents to the Arabic term 
shahīd, the seemingly equivalent word ‘martyr’ will be used interchangeably in the 
discussion below unless otherwise indicated in order to remove any ambiguity. Moreover, the 
technical/juristic definitions of the term shahīd are also important because of its centrality to 
our assessment of Boko Haram practices in Nigeria. The followers of the four Sunnī schools 
give various definitions for this term. 
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Some of the early jurists,
120
 especially the followers of the four widely-respected Sunnī 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence, did much work on defining the concept of martyr. All of 
them assert that he/she is a person killed by unbelievers on the battlefield. The ণanafī jurist 
al-Zaylaʽī (d. 743) states that the shahīd is ‘the one who is killed by the enemy of Muslims, 
by the brigands or by his fellow Muslims unjustly.’121 The famous MƗlikī scholar Abū al-
BarakƗt (d. 1201), defines him/her as, ‘the one who is killed by the enemy of Muslims 
whether killed inside or outside the Muslim territory.’122 The ণanbalī jurist ibn Mufliত (d. 
884), states that the shahīd is ‘the one who is killed by the unbelievers on the battlefield.’123 
The ShƗfiʽī jurist al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī (d. 977), repeated almost the same definition by ibn 
Mufliত.124 
 
The above juristic definitions encapsulate all the literal explanations given to the term 
‘shahīd’, such as presence, knowledge and witnessing, referred to above. The shahīd, 
according to those literal definitions, is named as such because he is physically present on the 
battlefield, and others know that if he is killed, he will be admitted to Paradise and the angels 
will bear witness to his dignified status in Paradise. This depends on a sincere intention to 
uphold Allah’s rule. 
 
Furthermore, the technical/juristic definitions transcend such literal meanings to include the 
Muslim who is killed by unbelievers on the battlefield. Of the above definitions, the ণanafī 
one appears to be the most comprehensive as it adds brigands and unjust killing by fellow 
Muslims to the category. In contrast to the ণanafī definition, the other three definitions refer 
only to unbelievers as being the killers. 
 
Boko Haram members view martyrs as ‘any member who fights and dies - by suicide 
bombing or otherwise - in the process of establishing a Sharia state would automatically 
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become a martyr and gain the reward of Aljanna - paradise or heaven.’125 Generalised 
rhetoric as such is religiously unacceptable and undermines Boko Haram claims about 
martyrdom for various reasons. First, the claim that all Boko Haram members killed while 
fighting against the Nigerian government, churches, or even against fellow Muslims are 
shuhadā‘, is not true because this understanding stands in total contrast to the very 
definition(s) of the shahīd cited above. Ironically, such claims about martyrdom and paradise 
rewards are unilaterally-declared by religiously unqualified leaders and members of Boko 
Haram to dress their practices in religiously acceptable attire through which current and 
hopeful recruits and supporters become more convinced of the attacks perpetrated, 
unfortunately, in the name of Islam.  
 
Second, the tragic incidents where non-Muslim places of worship, including Nigerian 
churches, are targeted,
126
 throws doubt on the shahīd status of the perpetrator in case of his 
death. Surprisingly, such atrocious attacks constitute a total disregard of Qur’Ɨnic verses, 
such as 34:40. As a religion, Islam calls for the protection of five main collective objectives, 
famously known as al-Kulliyyāt al-Khamsah: religion, self, intellect, honour, and property. 
The destructive acts of Boko Haram here violate the sanctity of religion, self, and property 
and are, therefore, strongly prohibited. It is internationally understood that the Nigerian 
government and the non-Muslims in Nigeria are not at war with Muslims in general or the 
Boko Haram minority in particular. Therefore, equitable, fair, tolerant, and righteous 
treatment should be applied by both sides. The Qur’Ɨn instructs Muslims in 60:8 saying, 
‘Allah does not forbid you to deal justly and kindly with those who fought not against you on 
account of religion and did not drive you out of your homes. Verily, Allah loves those who 
deal with equity.’ 
  
Third, the response to such unsubstantiated claims of martyrdom has not as of yet, according 
to our best understanding, been put in a more detailed and Islamically evidence-based manner 
before international legal bodies, such as the ICC. Generalised responses which decry the un-
Islamic actions of Boko Haram are still dominating the scene inside Nigeria itself.
127
 Outside 
the Nigerian territories, renowned organisations, such al-Azhar in Egypt, follow the same line 
of generalised condemnation. In what can be described as its only published statement so far, 
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Sawt al-Azhar, the official mouthpiece of the internationally-renowned al-Azhar 
establishment in Egypt, quoted the Sheikh of al-Azhar
128
 as saying: 
 
Sheikh Al-Azhar extremely denounces the attacks which took place in Nigeria 
that were linked to the “Boko Haram” group. The Grand Imam condemns such 
actions committed by some stray groups; such as these vicious bombings, 
bloodshed of innocent lives, as well as flagrant attacks on places of worship. 
The Grand Imam emphasized that Islam is innocent of such irresponsible 
actions. Islam incriminates such unlawful and vicious acts and punishes such 
crimes.
129
 
 
Therefore, it can be safely deduced that Boko Haram attacks are considered suicidal 
bombings where innocents are unjustifiably killed, rather than martyrdom. However, well-
articulated and detailed responses are still needed of reputable Muslim international 
organisations, such as al-Azhar, because of their international impact to expose the practices 
of Boko Haram. Serious evidence-based studies also help stem the spread of the ideological 
tide of Boko Haram and other similar groups internationally. 
 
3.3 Inciting to and Committing Suicide 
Through their emotionally-driven inciting rhetoric, religious leaders undisputedly goad their 
followers to violence. They even, sometimes, ‘increase the likelihood of conflict onset.’130 As 
for the second signature issue, it can be stated that while Boko Haram members think that 
they may not contribute to feeding religious violence, the skewed religious discourse they 
employ makes them religiously responsible for fomenting religious tension that eventually 
lure their adherents to commit suicide in the name of Islam.
131
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Before clarifying the Islamic stance on the prohibition of committing suicide—which 
members of Boko Haram wrongfully conceive as martyrdom as earlier explained—it is 
equally important to also clarify the attitude of Islam concerning incitement to violence. 
Incitement (taۊrīḍ) and supporting (‘iʽānah) (i.e. in committing a criminal act) are two terms 
frequently quoted in such a context. In Islamic law, ܒaۊrīḍ is to lure a person to commit a 
crime irrespective of whether the act itself leads to a crime or not. Inciting others to commit a 
crime is, according to Muslim jurists, a punishable crime on its own. It is also a sinful act 
(maʽ܈iyah) and a command to commit that which is evil (munkar).132 Incitement is also a 
criminalised act under international law.
133
 ‘Iʽānah is also a crime like taۊrīḍ. The person 
offering logistic support for the perpetrator is a collaborator (mu‘īn) in the crime.134 It is 
clear, according to Muslim jurists from the way they discussed ܒaۊrīḍ and ‘iʽānah, that they 
go as far as to encompass verbal and non-verbal forms. Both inciting and supporting verbal 
and non-verbal techniques are employed by Boko Haram leaders towards their followers and 
sympathisers who are 'nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, obedient to only one line of 
command, ready to be unleashed at the rest of the society.'
135
 The late Boko Haram leader, 
Yusuf, for example, used to emphasise his own ideas when addressing his followers in a 
broader and more sweeping condemnation of the many things which he considered 
Islamically-prohibited.
136
 Thus, Boko Haram leaders who incite and offer spiritual, moral, 
and logistic support to their followers are certainly participating in the crimes committed and, 
therefore, deserve punishment under Islamic law as well as international law. 
 
As for the ordinary Boko Haram members who irrationally follow their own leaders and are 
lured to commit suicide attacks, they are committing an abominable crime which secures its 
perpetrator an abode in the Hellfire according to Qur’Ɨn 4:29-30. It is also a crime which is 
‘strictly prohibited in Islamic law’.137 Interestingly, there are various occurrences of the 
expression qatl al-nafs in the Qur’Ɨn (2:54, 195; 4:29-30, 66; 18:6; 26:3). In these 
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occurrences, terms such as qatl al-nafs, tahlukah (self-destruction), and bakhʽ138 (killing 
oneself because of sorrow) are used. The Qur’Ɨn never uses the word 'intiۊār' (suicide), 
although some exegetes, such as al-ShaʽrƗwī, have interpreted qatl al-nafs as intiۊār.139 
Intiۊār, or suicide, as the self-inflicted action of killing oneself intentionally. The term does 
not occur in classical Arabic lexicons.
140
 Kamali states that ‘suicide bombing has no 
precedent in Islamic law and history and it is a new issue, open in that sense to fresh 
contributions.’141  In a clear prohibition of suicide and mutual killing, God says in the Qur’Ɨn: 
‘You who believe, do not wrongfully consume each other’s wealth but trade by mutual 
consent. Do not kill each other [do not kill yourselves], for God is merciful to you. If any of 
you does these things, out of hostility and injustice, We shall make him suffer Fire: that is 
easy for God.’142 
 
Most classical mainstream exegeses support the interpretation of the Qur’Ɨnic phrase ‘walā 
taqtulū anfusakum’ (do not kill yourselves) as a prohibition against mutual killing.143  The 
famous Egyptian exegete al-ShaʽrƗwī takes the view that ‘qatl al-nafs’ in this verse may 
mean four things: individual suicide, individual mukhāܒarah (risking one’s life), killing others 
with the consequence of being killed in retaliation, and mutual killing.
144
 He does not give 
preference to one explanation over another, although he gives fuller consideration to 
individual suicide. He appears to be the only modern exegete who gives a definition of 
suicide.
145  
He also turns to the Sunnah to buttress his argument, citing the following 
Prophetic Hadīth as a clear evidence for the prohibition of suicide:146 Jundub ibn ʽAbdullƗh 
narrates that Prophet Muতammad is reported to have said: ‘A man from those previous to you 
felt apprehensive about a wound he sustained. Therefore, he severed his hand with a knife 
and died from loss of blood. Whereupon Allah said: My servant anticipated my action by 
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taking his own life; therefore, he will not be admitted into Paradise.’147 Thus, when members 
of Boko Haram launch attacks even against Islamic clerics opposed to the group
148
 and some 
of their members die as a result, then the act itself is a crime according to the Qur’Ɨnic 
prohibition of mutual killing as well as the Prophetic Hadīth above. 
 
In addition to killing themselves through suicide, members of Boko Haram might be 
committing other crimes according to Islamic law.  Firstly, in their suicide attacks, civilians 
are killed and the taking of human life, based on his\her faith,
149
 race, or geographical 
location is strongly prohibited according to the Qur’Ɨn 17:33. It is clear that civilians who are 
killed at places of worships, markets and other places as a result of Boko Haram attacks are 
merely targeted because of their religion, faith, cult, or otherwise.
150 
Al-RƗzī states that the 
Qur’Ɨn 17:33 indicates that taking of a human life without a just cause is the greatest sin after 
associating partners with Allah. He emphasises that al-ۊurmah al-mughallaẓah (strong 
prohibition) is the original ruling that governs killing others unjustly, affirming that killing 
can only be legitimate if clear reasons are established;
151
 which is not actually the case with 
Boko Haram members targeting and killing non-combatants.
152 
Secondly, in their suicide 
attacks civilians’ bodies are mutilated and a ‘number of victims are burned alive’153 which is 
also another crime in its own rights and which is strictly prohibited in Islam. In a farewell 
address to Muslim soldiers heading for a battle with the Byzantines, Caliph Abu Bakr, said: 
I recommend to you that you fear Allah and obey Him. When you engage the 
enemies do not loot, do not mutilate the dead, do not commit treachery, do not 
behave cowardly, do not kill children, the elderly or women, do not burn trees 
or damage crops, and do not kill an animal unless lawfully acquired for food. 
You will come across men confined to hermitages in which they claim to have 
dedicated their lives to worshipping God, leave them alone.
154
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If the above quotation is meant for enemy combatants, it is prohibited, a fortiori, for Boko 
Haram members to commit such suicide attacks in which, according to Cook, civilians are 
frequently killed.
155
  
 
Thirdly, in their suicide attacks, properties belonging to others are destroyed which is also a 
prohibited act that is considered, according to the Qur’Ɨn 5:33, corruption (fasād).156 
According to al-ShaʽrƗwī, the ‘fasād’ in this verse generally refers to the prohibition of 
causing corruption to humans by targeting them as well as destroying fauna and flora.
157
 
These include, for example, ‘the destruction and burning down of houses and religious 
objects of a specifically targeted community.’158 Finally,  during and right after the suicide 
attacks committed by Boko Haram members, there are certainly Muslim and non-Muslim 
passers-by who are terrified, resulting in having their rights infringed upon, paths obstructed, 
and possessions seized which are also prohibited acts according the Qur’Ɨn 5:33.159 
 
 
3.4 Boko Haram Practices in Light of Islamic Criminal Law  
Having attempted to clarify that Boko Haram practices are neither jihād nor martyrdom but 
rather criminal acts encouraged by ill-informed people about their own Islamic tradition and 
executed by members who are mostly intellectually-hijacked by their leaders, it is time now 
to raise two concluding questions. Under which criminal category can the practices of Boko 
Haram members be classified within the Islamic criminal law?  
To answer the first question, it is essential to state that crime (jarīmah) in Islamic law refers 
to a prohibited act for which Allah sets a deterring punishment either through a fixed penalty 
(ۊadd) or through a discretionary one (taʽzīr).160 It is submitted that the crimes committed by 
members of Boko Haram, discussed above, fall within the category of ۊudūd (pl. ۊadd); 
namely the crime of ۊirābah (brigandage, banditry, highway robbery); which is an essential 
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category of ۊudūd within the Islamic criminal law system stricto sensu.161 Within the Sunnī 
legal theory, there are three terms that are widely used for ۊirābah; the first is ۊirābah itself, 
the second is qaܒʽ al-ܑarīq (highway robbery), and the third is sariqah kubrā (great theft, 
larceny).
162
 The first term is employed here because of its strong relevance and similarity to 
the actual crimes committed by Boko Haram members, and the fact that the term ۊirābah 
itself covers the two other terms. While ۊirābah is a crime, the punishment for which is 
mentioned in the Qur’Ɨn 5:33-34, it is not noticeable to find classical or modern Qur’Ɨn 
interpreters working on a definition for this concept. Rather, they pick the definition(s) for the 
term from relevant original Islamic law sources for their own exegetical use. Recently, an 
attempt has been made to reach a comprehensive definition of ۊirābah based on selected 
major Sunnī Islamic law sources from classical and modern sources. The definition arrived at 
goes as follows: 
ۉirābah is the premeditated act of a sane and mature individual (or group of 
individuals) aimed at frightening, robbing, killing and/or transgressing against 
non-combatants’ dignity, carried out from a position of shawkah (power). The 
targets in ۊirābah may be Muslims or non-Muslims, in any setting, be it a 
village, a city, at sea or in the air.
163
 
 
Certain main elements can be extracted from the above definition. First, the act of terrorising 
people. Undoubtedly, innocent civilians who are not primarily targeted by Boko Haram 
attackers or suicide bombers are terrorised. MƗlikī jurists consider any action intended to 
terrorise people to be a core act of ۊirābah, irrespective of whether a weapon is used or not. 
This element is considered the greatest common denominator between ۊirābah and terrorism 
because it is a distinctive characteristic of both crimes.
164
 Second, causing corruption 
(fasād).165 Abou El Fadl states that the classical jurists, almost without exception, argued that 
those who attack residents and wayfarers in order to terrorise them are corrupters of the earth 
(mufsidūna fī al-Arḍ),166 something that Boko Haram attackers certainly do with or without 
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intention. Importantly, ‘frightening the secured, destroying their public interests, life 
essentials and human dignity for the purpose of sowing aggression and corruption on earth’167 
was the definition of terrorism given by the Islamic Research Academy at al-Azhar in 
Cairo
168 on 1 November 2001. Abou El Fadl also adds that, the Qur’Ɨn refers to various forms 
of corrupting the earth, such as terrorising residents and wayfarers, as well as other attacks in 
which non-combatants are targeted.
169 
However, the main form of corruption that is directly 
related to terrorism from a Qur’Ɨnic perspective is taking the life of a human being unjustly, 
irrespective of his\her faith,
170
 race or geographical location. Such terrorist acts are strongly 
prohibited in the Qur’Ɨn 17:33. Unquestionably, Boko Haram members who carry out the 
attacks target the above categories in a blatant violation of the core principles of international 
law as well as Islamic law texts and, more importantly, the definitive (qaܒʽī) Qur’Ɨn texts. 
Third, based on the Qur’Ɨnic verses 5:32-33 Al-ShaʽrƗwī argues that fasād is of two types. In 
the first type, the perpetrator personally attempts to take revenge for a previous aggression 
against him initiated by the other party, which is a common occurrence with Boko Haram. 
This personal revenge, according to al-ShaʽrƗwī, is prohibited not because it is reciprocating 
aggression, but because of the violation of Islamic law, which prohibits people from taking 
the law into their own hands. They would be applying their own laws, disregarding the 
authoritative bodies appointed to settle personal grudges primarily through legal channels.
171
 
The second type, according to al-ShaʽrƗwī, is the terrorisation of people with whom there is 
no cause for dispute. Examples of this are the Boko Haram attacks against both church and 
Mosque goers. According to al-ShaʽrƗwī, this is the most apt example of ۊirābah,172 as it 
perfectly relates to the essence of the two verses  referred to. Indeed, this description of 
ۊirābah generally corresponds to terrorism as in this latter example there is also no dispute 
between the terrorist\suicide bomber and his innocent victims. The targets are targeted not 
because of their own status, but to subdue those in authority, such as rulers or governments, 
so that they succumb to the perpetrators’ demands. This is also a clear example of Boko 
Haram practice. Therefore, the violent acts of Boko Haram in Nigeria are considered ۊirābah 
acts based on the above definition and the extracted elements. Accepting the common view  
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that the classical ۊirābah crime 'corresponds in its most salient features' to the modern crime 
of terrorism,
173
 the current practices of Boko Haram members especially those related to the 
main elements of ۊirābah discussed above are all punishable acts of terrorism according to 
international law and Islamic law. 
 
As far as the Islamic law is concerned, if the alleged members of Boko Haram proved to be 
guilty of committing acts of ۊirābah—which has been proven to be slightly different from or 
almost identical to modern perverted acts of terrorism—and are to be tried before a court 
which applies solely Islamic law, then the punishments for ۊirābah applies to them. 
Interestingly, the punishments are mentioned in the following Qur’Ɨnic verses: 
 
Those who wage war against God and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption 
in the land should be punished by death, crucifixion, the amputation of an alternate 
hand and foot, or banishment from the land: a disgrace for them in this world, and 
then a terrible punishment in the Hereafter, unless they repent before you overpower 
them— in that case bear in mind that God is forgiving and merciful.174  
 
Classical and modern Qur’Ɨn interpreters and jurists are in agreement that the punishments 
mentioned in the above verse (Qur’Ɨn 5:33) are the prescribed punishments for ۊirābah. The 
punishments are execution, crucifixion, the amputation of a hand and a foot on opposite 
sides, or banishment from the land. There are two main approaches to these four alternative 
punishments.
175 
The first approach seeks to establish proportionality between the crime and 
the punishment, whereas the second approach authorises the Muslim ruler to use his 
discretion in applying the punishment. Abou El Fadl calls the first approach ‘tartīb’ and the 
second ‘takhyīr’.176 These punishments are considered the most severe punishments in 
Islam.
177 
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It has become clear now that the Qur’Ɨn does not condone terrorist acts. Indeed, terrorist acts 
are crimes for which the most severe punishments are prescribed. The four alternative 
punishments, ranging from execution to exile, are set as a deterrent for heinous crimes 
committed by Boko Haram members and similar groups committing the same acts. Although 
the punishment may seem cruel at first glance, this falls into perspective when the interest of 
the whole society is taken into consideration.
178 
 
 
Finally, the four worldly punishments for terrorism put forward by the Qur’Ɨn above, provide 
workable mechanisms for those in authority if they want a moral and practical basis to 
combat terrorism. 
 
4 General Remarks and Conclusion 
The dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation in Nigeria together with the lack of 
comprehensive understanding about the meaning of Islam among the majority of the Muslim 
population have paved the way to unqualified sheiks, and other (self-) titled religious 
“leaders” ‘to advance their views by propagating erroneous notions of Islam that the largely 
ignorant masses are ready to accept and follow, than true religious scholars.’179  
As evident from the present study, suicide attacks, the indiscriminate killings of civilians, 
spreading terror among civilian population and the destruction of religious places can under 
no circumstances be justified with reference to Islamic religion and ‘no amount of doctrinal 
rationalization by certain politically motivated or insufficiently informed Muslim theologians 
and political activists can alter this conclusion.’180  
There is no room in Islamic law for excuses or justification for such atrocious acts and 
Shari’a confers on every citizen the right to refuse to commit a crime, should any government 
or administrator order him to do so.
181
 The Prophet is reported to have said ‘there is no 
obedience in transgression: obedience is required in righteousness.’182  
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As noted by Bassiouni, ‘Islam rejects the postulate the ends justify the means because it is a 
religion grounded in values that require that ends and means conform to its specific dictates, 
and to its higher values and principles.’183 His observations on the contemporary meaning of 
jihad are very significant to our current discourse:         
In the last 40 years, jihad as political violence has become nothing more than a 
revolutionary doctrine to justify those who engage in it by appealing to the legitimacy 
of their self-proclaimed ends. The theological technique used to achieve this ends is to 
cherry-pick among verses of the Quran, the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet), 
historic events and practices, fatwa(s), and theological pronouncements. This 
technique, which is contrary to the accepted techniques of ‘ilm usul al-fiqh, and also 
contrary to fiqh (doctrine), has permitted all sorts of self-serving interpretations, 
which are essentially distortions of the Shari’a. Those who engage in this method use 
a discourse of political rhetoric couched in theological terms that blurs the distinction 
between the lawful and the unlawful. The rhetoric, however, becomes powerful in it 
popular effect.
184
 
The study also reveals that armed jihad can only be declared by a lawful authority ‘which is 
to be granted when the country is threatened with invasion’.185 According to Ibn Qudamah, 
‘declaring jihad is the responsibility of the Ruler and it depends on his independent 
consideration and judgment. The citizen’s duty is to obey when jihad is duly declared by a 
lawful Ruler.’186 There is also consensus among the majority of Muslim jurists that ‘Islam 
does not permit recourse to violence that disturbs peace and order in society even if it be 
against a government of questionable legitimacy so long as that government stays short of 
blatant indulgence criminality and kufr (denial and rejection of Islam).’187 
It is also simplistic to equate suicide bombing with martyrdom as Boko Haram has claimed 
and can be refuted based on the following reasons as rightly observed by Kamali: 
a) Suicide bombings challenges two fundamental principles of Islam: the prohibition 
against suicide and the deliberate killing of civilians; 
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b) The Prophet Muhammad clearly sought to draw a line separating martyrdom in battle 
from suicide;  
c) The Prophet repudiated and denounced those who deliberately took their own lives in 
the course of battle, even by a warrior suffering from severe wounds; 
d) The Muslim fighters enters the battle not with intention of dying, but with the 
conviction that if he should die, it would be for reasons beyond his control; 
e) Martyrdom does not begin with suicidal intention, let alone the linkage of that 
intention with the killing of civilians; 
f)  Suicide bombers intentionally set out to kill themselves and other civilians and thus 
violate the norms of Islamic law and ethics.
188
  
In his survey on the doctrinal prescriptions of Islam in the conduct of foreign policy Gene W. 
Heck arrived to the following conclusion: 
In short, as its roots, Islam rightly prides itself as a “religion of tolerance” (“dīn al-
tasāmuh”) and there is little within its doctrine to suggest otherwise. As such, the 
practices of modern terrorist groups that purport to operate under its banner may be 
seen as antithetical to its very teachings.  
For in its prescriptions, Qur’ānic doctrine directly refutes, rather than supports, the 
modern tactics of militant “jihadi” networks. This is the most critical of findings. For 
recognition of this reality is critical to any strategy that seeks t mitigate the spread of 
terrorism and spare future generations from the nihilism of terror now perpetrated in 
Islam’s sacred name.189  
Islam also prohibits accusing others of disbelieve or takfīr an infidelizing  ideology which has 
been adopted  by some members of Boko Haram for achieving personal aims and political 
gains. The Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayyeb, has recently described 
takfīr as a ‘blind sedition and a catastrophe for Islam.’190 He stressed that takfīr aims to 
distort the image of Islam and criticized the spread of takfīri fatwas in the Muslim world and 
those who issue such fatwas.
191
 Recently, Dar al-Ifta Al-Missriyyah warned against this 
ideology and emphasised that accusing other of disbelief is governed by certain principles, 
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provisions, and rulings.
192
 It added, ‘that the danger of such an infidelizing ideology lies in 
killing and unlawfully consuming the wealth of the person accused of disbelief, lying and 
hypocrisy under the pretext of Allah’s cause and finally executing terrorist operations and 
killing peaceful civilians.’193 
As for the acts of spreading terror amongst civilians and the indiscriminate and systematic 
killings of civilians and children as practiced and continued to be practiced by members of 
Boko Haram the present study arrived to the conclusion that these acts amount to the crime of 
hirābah, a had (pl. hudūd) crime explicitly proscribed in the Qur’Ɨn where punishment is 
mandatory.
194
 It is worth pointing out that the deadly attacks against school children and the 
prohibition of English education in Nigerian schools by members of Boko Haram was 
recently condemned in an official statement by the Grand Mufti of Egypt.
195
 He quoted the 
following verse from the Qur’Ɨn in order to emphasis the respect of the sanctity of life and 
the prohibition of aggression against it, be it Muslim or non-Muslim:
196
  
 
On that account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if any one slew a person – 
unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slew the 
whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole 
people. Then although there came to them Our messengers with clear signs, yet, even after 
that, many of them continued to commit excesses in the land. Qur’Ɨn 5:32 [Yusuf Ali 
translation]  
 
The primary purpose of the ICC is to provide justice for victims of such heinous crimes as 
those suffered by Nigerian civilians at the hands of Boko Haram. However the selection of 
certain situations and not others for prosecution before the ICC has drawn heavy criticism on 
the Court. Adding to this the choice of mainly western inspired law to be applied at the Court 
makes the institution seem even more imperialistic and can damage the perception of its 
legitimacy in Africa and elsewhere. With the appointment of the first African jurist to be the 
Court’s prosecutor, the ICC seems to be trying to change its image of ‘white people 
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prosecuting black people’ however one could argue that a stronger step away from the 
perceived imperialistic patronising attitude would be for the Court to acknowledge the 
cultures and legal systems of the countries from which the situations stem. If the Nigerian 
investigations eventually lead to prosecution, the acknowledgement in all phases of the trial 
that these crimes are not merely criminalized in the international or western legal systems, 
but also under Islamic Law, would prove that the Court is truly universal, that it has the 
knowledge and respect for different cultures and legal systems, even if it does not strictly 
apply their laws and last but not least it would give a sense of dignity to the victims 
themselves.
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